[Opinion] Revisiting Inter-Korean Relations: The Prospects of Denuclearization under Yoon Suk Yeol’s administration
Brillin Yapply — FPCI Chapter Universitas Airlangga
Since the establishment of the two republics in 1948, the South’s relation to the North under three changes of administration has been accompanied by ideological discontinuities. Inter-Korean relations under conservative administrations were characterized by containment, estrangement, and hostilities, while those under liberal administrations were characterized by engagement, conciliation, and cooperation. Mosler (2022) argues that none of the two approaches proved successful in achieving sustainable peace on the peninsula, let alone denuclearization or (re)unification. In order to explain the extent of prospects for inter-Korean relations in the new presidential administration, understanding President Moon Jae In’s Korea Peninsula Policy (Hanbandojŏngch’aek) characteristics and achievements will be very important.
In the first one-and-a-half years since President Moon’s inauguration in Spring 2017, inter-Korean relations had progressively increased. Moon’s administration through Korea Peninsula Policy, scored a few points including the goal of sustainable peace and prosperity, declaring readiness for dialogue for improving inter-Korean relations, and a proposed step-by-step approach for negotiating the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, the administration formulated a long-term and comprehensive policy to achieve peace and prosperity on the peninsula. Lastly, the led-by-Korea approach to integrating the North as a cooperation partner and the whole international community (Mosler, 2022). These approaches perceived North as an opponent, and potential partner at the same time.
Through the approaches/policies above, the South is able to formulate its visions. Mosler (2022) analyzes the South has three visions, including peace first, mutual respect, and open policy. Due to the challenging tasks of denuclearization, Moon’s administration focused on the “peace first” and prosperity vision to avoid complicating engagement with North Korea. Due to challenging tasks for reunification, “mutual respect” takes place as the South neither wants the North to collapse nor pursue unification by absorption. Lastly, “open policy” shows how flexible the administration is upon choices and possible modifications. Also, in attempts to prosper the Inter-Korean relation, the South constantly offered dialogue while still, maintaining pressure through sanctions. Importantly, denuclearization is not made a precondition for negotiation. However, without much dialogue or withdrawal of sanctions needed, the strategy has been proven up until now only produces only more tension, not less (Mosler, 2022).
The author argues that the main factor that hampered denuclearization is the disproportionate involvement degree between the United States (US) and China. First, President Moon missed the led-by-Korea approach and has allowed the US to involve in negotiation heavily. Initially, it was intended for easier coordination on a wide range of issues to be pursued through the joint. Until early 2018, Moon was able to consistently draw a clear line for North’s provocations by explicitly condemning statements, missile tests, and leveraging its alliance with the US. This doesn’t last long since the involvement of the US in the Hanoi Summit 2019 with the North. Where, the US messed up the progress by demanding a “complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement” of North Korea’s nuclear program in exchange for a vague return (Shin, 2022a).
Secondly, since North Korea holds similar ideological communist roots as China and is labeled as China’s subordinate and unfortunately the South has missed counting on China’s denuclearization (Kim, 2021). Too little presence of China in the discourse can discourage the North from taking a step forward to denuclearize . North relies on its nuclear presence for its security and importance in the region. Since it seems like the South is gang-ing up with the big guy (US) to bully the North. Therefore, this will lead to a more stubborn and defensive method with the continuous and upcoming missile launch despite the signed agreement (Einhorn, 2021).
As the new President, Yoon Suk Yeol in some part of his inauguration speech offered friendly overtures, realizing that North Korea’s nuclear weapons are a threat but, there’s always an open door for peaceful dialogue to resolve this (Shin, 2022b). As expected, he — like the preceding conservative presidents, planned to make denuclearization a precondition, before strengthening the economy. It’s proven to be ineffective and impossible because the North won’t just respond to speech. More than that, it’s neglecting dialogue and trust-building between mutual respect of the Peninsula (Mosler, 2022).
Referring to this, several things South should consider in the new administration. Firstly, it should decrease the US presence in the Inter-Korean relation on denuclearization agreement, and ever since the North has enhanced nuclear equipment where the strikes can reach the US continent. As a close ally, the South should be considering whether the US would risk its continent for the sake of defending South territory upon North strikes. Next, the South should start counting on China as a key ally. This will help the South to shape the North’s behavior on denuclearization. Then, should help the North shift importance on nuclear worth to the basis of the economical foundation through potential trilateral economic cooperation between the South, North, and China. Lastly, the South can actively engage in the international state (region–like ASEAN) since it’s vital to increase its importance in exchange for support of denuclearization from neighboring countries.
References:
Einhorn, Robert, 2021, “The Key Choices Now Facing the Biden Administration on North Korea” Brookings [Online]. Available in https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-key-choices-now-facing-the-biden-administration-on-north-korea/ [Accessed on 10 June 2022]
Kim, P. M, 2021. “Advancing Denuclearization and Peace Diplomacy With North Korea”, Arms Control Association [Online]. Available in https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-01/features/advancing-denuclearization-peace-diplomacy-north-korea [Accessed on 10 June 2022]
Min, TaeEun, Taeyeon Hwang, and Seungsoo Hyun, 2022. “Cooperation with the US, China, and Russia for Denuclearization of North Korea.” Korean Institute for National Unification [Online]. Available in https://www.kinu.or.kr/2022/eng/0513/co22-13e.pdf [Accessed on 10 June 2022]
Mosler, H. B, 2022, “Lessons learned? South Korea’s foreign policy toward North Korea under the Moon Jae-in administration”, Working Papers on East Asian Studies 132. The University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute of East Asian Studies IN-EAST [Online]. Available in https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/udedao/132.html [Accessed on 4 June 2022]
Shin, Mitch, 2022a. “Has Moon Jae-in’s North Korea Process Failed?”, The Diplomat [Online]. Available in https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/has-moon-jae-ins-north-korea-peace-process-failed/ [Accessed on 6 June 2022]
Shin, Mitch, 2022b. “At Inauguration, Yoon Suk-yeol Shows Old School Approach to North Korea”, The Diplomat [Online]. Available in https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/at-inauguration-yoon-suk-yeol-shows-old-school-approach-to-north-korea/ [Accessed on 1 June 2022]
