[Opinion Article] India’s Response Towards Ukraine Crisis: Subtle Support for Russia Disguised Under Strategic Ambivalence?

Arya Ahmad Afani — FPCI Chapter Universitas Airlangga

The ongoing crisis in Ukraine has pushed many countries to take sides. Western countries unequivocally condemned Russia’s aggression and atrocities in Ukraine and imposed economic and financial sanctions towards Russia. Few countries such as Belarus, Eritrea, Syria, and North Korea showed support by voting in favor of Russia in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (Lederer & Peltz, 2022). India however, has kept its neutral stance by abstaining in both UNGA and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions related to Russia’s military aggression towards Ukraine (The Wire, 2022).

India’s neutral stance is not an anomaly in its foreign policy. India’s neutrality principle has its roots in historical context especially during the Cold War. During the early stages of independence, both the Soviet Union and the US didn’t show India’s strategic position in the Cold War due to lack of mutual interest. The colonial experience and anti-imperialism sentiment also shaped India’s public opinion by rejecting any notion of reverence to either external power. Both of those factors encouraged India to adopt neutral foreign policy to preserve sovereignty and ensure survival in the Cold War era (Ganguly, 2010). India’s immense contribution in Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and long term adoption of its value shows how important the principle of neutrality is in India’s foreign policy.

In practice, India’s neutrality has wide implementation as it adjusts to historical context. As the tension during the Cold War was increasing, India was forced to lean towards the Soviet Union due to growing relations between the US and Pakistan and Soviet’s contempt towards China which India also shared (Choudhury et al., 2022). This relationship continued in the Post-Cold War era as both countries have mutual interest in certain issues. For example, Russia defended India’s nuclear test in 1998 and supported India’s claim over Kashmir. In return, India remained silent on Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Thakur (1991) used the term ‘reciprocity of silence’ to explain the relationship between India and Soviet Union/Russia.

India also relies heavily on Russian military equipment due to historical ties between two countries. Around 62% of India’s arm imports are from Russia and India is the biggest Russian arms importer which accounted for 32% Russian arms exports (CRS, 2021). Russia’s advanced military equipment is needed to fight border skirmishes against China and face Pakistan as the tension grows. Aside from military reliance, India also needs to preserve its ties with Russia to prevent Russia-China alliance targeted against India. In short, India can’t afford to lose to Russia at this moment due to complex relations. India also increases its oil imports from Russia to capitalize on high energy prices (Menon, 2022). Thus, India’s neutrality is not merely ideological but also pragmatic.

James Crabtree (2022) cited in Ng (2022), argued that India is trapped between the interest of external powers. India needs to balance its relations with both Russia and the West strategically to counter China’s threat. Chang (2022) argued that India should go back to the middle path instead of aligning itself with Russia disguised under strategic ambivalence. Russia wouldn’t help India if there is a war between India and China due to its close ties with China. The commitment that the West has been demonstrating for Ukraine shows that the West is willing to go further length to support its allies in times of crisis.

The writer argues that India is on the right path to secure its national interest by taking advantage of international political conditions. By remaining neutral, India has many options to engage in international politics and pursue case-by-case policy without much restraints from external power. Even though India’s neutrality tends to tilt towards Russia at the moment, this only happens in the short run. India still needs Russia’s support on Kashmir in UNSC, Russian military equipment, and Russia’s neutrality on border conflict against China. However, India’s strategic ambivalence has its limits. The question is not whether India should lean towards the West or Russia. Instead, India should be careful not to cross any of the ‘red lines’ that each external power has, especially the West. The US has threatened China with economic sanctions if China decides to help Russia. Although the threat is not aimed at India, India’s oil import from Russia could potentially be seen as help towards Russia by funding Russia’s invasion indirectly. At the moment, India still needs both Russia and the West to secure its national interest, hence India should balance its relations carefully among external powers.

Bibliography

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Thakur, R., 1991. “India and the Soviet Union: Conjunctions and Disjunctions of Interests”, Asian Survey, 31(9):826–846.

The Wire, 2022. “India Abstains on the Second Resolution on Ukraine in UN General Assembly” The Wire [Online]. In https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-abstains-on-the-second-resolution-on-ukraine-in-un-general-assembly [Accessed May 8, 2022].