[Opinion Article] Imminent Bloom of Pacifica Bougainville(a):
Reorienting Indonesia’s Interests in the Pacific
Philipus Mikhael Priyo Nugroho
Although Pacifica Bougainville(a) sounds similar to botanical binomial nomenclature, it refers to a prospective new country in the Pacific, namely Bougainville. As it stands now, Bougainville is an autonomous province of Papua New Guinea (PNG). Back in 2019, it had declared itself to be independent through a non-binding referendum that was a part of a peace compromise between it and the PNG government. Although 97,7% of eligible Bougainvilleans voted pro for independence in the referendum, due to its non-binding nature, statehood status ultimately depends on PNG’s decision. However, due to intensive political exchanges, the road to independence has garnered significant steps between the political entities. These include the start of constitutional drafting, the Era Kone Covenant, which covers the mechanisms to ratify the referendum, and the certainty that Bougainville would be entirely independent by 2027 (Department of PMNEC, 2020). Minding that PNG is a geographically close neighbor to Indonesia, this issue should certainly be in Indonesia’s strategic consideration.
The writer opined that in the face of security challenges in the Pacific, Indonesia should keep a close eye on the emerging country of Bougainville while avoiding recognizing it straightforwardly. It is imperative to understand that the imminent Bougainvillean independence is nuanced; it is either an act of self-determination or a vile attempt to jeopardize national unity. As mentioned by Crowther (2019), the history of Bougainville after its incorporation into PNG has been volatile, with more than a decade of infighting and civil wars, primarily due to unequal redistribution of wealth. Despite the fear of negatively exacerbating the volatile situation back home, Indonesia should still be vigilant about foreign actors entering the premises and the potential effect on its Pacific interests.
Countries that share the same region are interconnected in various aspects, making stability sine-qua-non with their levels of economic prosperity. Therefore, the stake for Indonesia in the Pacific has been that of an economic one, mainly through so-called its “Look East Policy”. Image rectification is also one of Indonesia’s core interests in the region, given the past cases of Timor-Leste and PNG’s objection to Indonesian counter-separatism acts back in the ’70s (Hastings, 1979). Via the goals stipulated in its Look East Policy, Indonesia translated its security interests in the region by portraying itself as an active player through checkbook diplomacy to capacity-building operations (Wardhani & Dugis, 2020). With the certainty that Bougainville is a future state, Indonesia cannot possibly persuade PNG further to take extreme measures because it would increase the possibility of cross-border escalation.
Apart from the interests mentioned above, Indonesia’s intermediate level of power has endeavored to construct a security arrangement that focuses on disaster and climate crisis mitigation for the Pacific (Wati et al., 2018). However, many “traditional” global superpowers have recently attempted to project their security-related visions to the region. On the one hand, the world has witnessed QUAD assemble the nations of Japan, India, the USA, and Australia to simultaneously “guard” the Indo-Pacific. In response, China had ramped up its assertive foreign policy through a security agreement proposal with the Solomon Islands to deploy military personnel on security concerns (Kim, 2022). Following the current trajectory, navigating through numerous external power projections should be Bougainville’s top course of action, which internal political instabilities have already hindered substantially.
As having giants stomping through its planned marine garden of positive imagery is not enough, the blooming sprout of Pacifica Bougainville(a) carries the pollen of challenges for Indonesia’s antiseparatism campaign. Amidst strategic ambiguity to recognize or not, Indonesia should not heavily proliferate interventionist policies since it could jeopardize Indonesia-PNG bilateral relations. This argument exists since Bougainville still relies on PNG for international trade and economic activities. If the island felt overly restricted by interventions, it is not impossible for it to unilaterally declared independence–a horrible yet sure precedent for it its resurfacing of domestic conflicts (Connel, 2020). A firm guideline to approach this issue shall be at the forefront of Indonesia’s foreign policy due to geographical proximity, changing security architecture, and regional interests.
Bibliography
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Department of PMNEC (Prime Minister and National Executive Council), 2020. “National Government and ABG Endorse for Era Kone Covenant” [online], in NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND ABG ENDORSE FOR ERA KONE COVENANT (pmnec.gov.pg) [accessed by May 8th, 2022].
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