[Opinion Article] A Final Legacy: Jokowi and a Desire to Revive Indonesia Geopolitical Interest

Muhammad Raka Hadiyan — FPCI Chapter Universitas Airlangga

By August 17th 2022, millions of people in Indonesia are celebrating their independence, marking 77 years of freedom in the archipelago. On the same day, the president of Indonesia, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, will deliver his annual presidential address to the house of representatives (DPR). The address cannot be taken for granted. Mainly, it contains a lot of hints regarding how the president would shape his nation’s policies in the upcoming year.

Predicting what would be addressed annually by the president could be difficult. However, as of 2022, the author highly believes that Jokowi could no longer be focusing his upcoming policies and targets on the pandemic recovery which has been a primary agenda for the last two years (Setneg, 2021). Therefore, several analysts expect Jokowi to shift his attention back to regaining Indonesia’s geopolitical power. Besides the pandemic is under control, another motivation to rethink our geopolitical strategies is the growing tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, Indonesia is also set to take over the ASEAN chairmanship in 2023.

From one independence day to another, Jokowi’s geopolitical policies are not entirely bad. On August 17th 2015, the national independence day ceremony was held under the theme of maritime power (Setneg, 2015). That same year, Jokowi was highly encouraged to push back our maritime glory under the global maritime fulcrum (GMF) policy. However, several critics arose surrounding the policy: (1) changing government that produced a lot of inconsistent programs; (2) the desire to please external partners led to the loss of the government’s assertiveness; and (3) the policy that launched almost at the same time with China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) makes the GMF policy to look like a bandwagoning move (Caroline, 2021) (Yakti and Tsauro, 2021).

As those criticisms arose, followed by the spread of Covid-19 that forced the government to shift its attention, the GMF policy slowly vanished. In the last two years, Jokowi seems more motivated to deal with domestic issues rather than reshaping Indonesia’s geopolitical interest. It was not a wrong decision, considering other countries also focused on their national recovery after being severely hit by the pandemic. Despite all of that, it seems that the Jokowi administration still has the desire to revive Indonesia’s geopolitics. In February, the government released Presidential Decree №34/2022 to revive the GMF policy.

The decree is undoubtedly set to be the main framework of the Jokowi administration’s upcoming geopolitical approaches, especially in the maritime sector. It contains Jokowi’s current vision to continue “maritime diplomacy”, which refers to the form of diplomacy the government runs under the maritime interest. The expected outcome of the diplomacy encouragement is to achieve a sustainable blue economy, which is believed to be an essential cornerstone for the GMF policy enactment.

However, despite having a renewed vision regarding our geopolitical policies through the new Presidential Decree, there are several things that the author feels worth addressing,

• First, the term “geopolitics” should be comprehended in a broader view, which means the policy surrounding it should not be limited to just the maritime sector. The key is putting the GMF policy from the marine sector on the main agenda and finding its connection to other living sectors without having to leave all of them behind.
• Second, Indonesia should figure out how to integrate this new vision into some of the recent ASEAN security agendas. Considering Indonesia’s upcoming chairmanship, the growing tensions in Southeast Asia, and a recent phenomenon of hedging from its member states, ASEAN should never be excluded from any of Indonesia’s maritime policies.
• Third, it is crucial for the policymakers and every subject involved in its enactment to understand past critics and causes of failure surrounding the GMF policy in the first term of the Jokowi administration. Simply, there must be an assurance that every policy set in the new Presidential Decree could be consistent and reviewed under a specific timescale.

Lastly, the author also would like to highlight that enacting this new policy is a race against time. By 2024, the Jokowi administration would be dissolved, and the citizens would gain the right to vote for the new government. Therefore, the author believes the GMF policy could be a meaningful final legacy from the Jokowi administration, if they acted quickly and followed a correct timescale. By establishing a good policy and clever work, this policy would surely be continued by the next administration, whoever takes charge of this country.

Bibliography

Caroline, Edna, 2021. “Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum: From Hedging to Underbalancing”, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 8(3):413–432.

Peraturan Presiden Nomor 34 Tahun 2022 Tentang Rencana Aksi Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia Tahun 2021–2025, 2022. Jakarta: Presiden Republik Indonesia.

Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden RI Dalam Rangka HUT RI Ke-70, 2015. Jakarta: Kementerian Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia.

Pidato Presiden RI pada Sidang Tahunan MPR RI dan Sidang Bersama DPD RI dan DPR RI dalam rangka HUT Ke-76 Proklamasi Kemerdekaan RI, 2021. Jakarta: Kementerian Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia.

Yakti, Probo Darono, and M. Ahalla Tsauro, 2021. “Questioning Joko Widodo’s Global Maritime Fulcrum: Change and Overlap Policy”, Global Focus, 1(2):164–179.